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EVERY CLICK YOU MAKE: HOW THE
PROPOSED DISCLOSURE OF LAW
STUDENTS’ ONLINE IDENTITIES VIOLATES
THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
FREE ASSOCIATION
Jonathan Sabin
[W]hen a state attempts to make inquiries about a person‘s
beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First
Amendment. Broad and sweeping inquiries into these
protected areas . . . discourage citizens from exercising
rights protected by the Constitution. 1
You already have zero privacy. Get over it. 2
INTRODUCTION
In the hyper-connected world of online communication, we are
all just a few clicks away from Internet infamy. 3 Law students are

Brooklyn Law School Class of 2010; M.A. (Journalism) New York
University, 2002; B.A. Tufts University, 1999. Thanks to my mother, father, and
sister for all their love and support. Special thanks to Hila, whose constant
encouragement, enduring patience, and sense of humor got me through law
school.
1
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
2
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 105 (2007) (quoting Scott McNealy, CEO Sun
Microsystems).
3
See Rachel Abramowitz, Hollywood Brief: Christian Bale’s Call of
Contrition, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at E1 (reporting that Batman star Christian
Bale publicly apologized after a ―profanity-ridden audiotape of [him] ranting at
the director of photography on the set of [a movie] hit the Internet . . .‖).
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no exception.4 Armed with laptops, unlimited bandwidth, and an
inclination for procrastination, aspiring attorneys have proven
particularly susceptible to online misbehavior.5 For example, after
a Brooklyn Law School student posed naked for an online Playboy
video in 2006, a link to the video was forwarded to the student‘s
classmates, professors, and prospective employers. 6 Meanwhile, on
Autoadmit.com, one of the largest and bawdiest message boards
for current and prospective law students, 7 several anonymous law
students posted sexually offensive and humiliating comments
about their colleagues at Yale Law School. 8
To make matters worse, this Internet misconduct is
increasingly finding its way to the inboxes of potential employers. 9
According to a survey from the online job site Careerbuilder.com,
4

For example, in an email to Brooklyn Law School students, Dean Joan
Wexler noted that ―[o]ver the last few years we have seen instances, both here at
our law school and at law schools across the country, where individuals have
been the victims of discussions on blogs, mostly anonymous, that go beyond the
bounds of civilized discourse.‖ E-mail from Joan Wexler, Dean, Brooklyn Law
School & Beryl Jones-Woodin, Associate Dean for Student Affairs, Brooklyn
Law School, to Brooklyn Law School Community (Sept. 17, 2008) (on file with
author).
5
See Katherine Mangan, Etiquette for the Bar, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Jan. 12, 2007, at 31 (noting that law students at Drake University had set up
inflammatory Facebook groups called ―I Hate Legal Writing‖ and ―Drake Law
Drunks‖).
6
Veronika Belenkaya, It’s Juris-Imprudence: Holy Torts! Law Student in
Erotic Vid, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 10, 2007, at 3.
7
Autoadmit.com boasts around one million unique visitors a month. See
Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web: Law Students Feel
Lasting Effects of Anonymous Attacks, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at A01.
8
Id. See also David Margolick, Slimed Online, PORTFOLIO MAG., Mar.
2009 (reporting that the anonymous users falsely claimed that certain Yale
students had herpes, bribed their way into Yale, and that one of them
―exchanged oral sex with Yale Law School‘s dean for a passing grade in civil
procedure‖).
9
See Alan Finder, When a Risque Online Persona Undermines a Chance
for a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 11, 2006, at Nat‘l Desk 1 (―[S]ome recruiters are
looking up applicants on social networking sites like Facebook, MySpace,
Xanga and Friendster, where college students often post risqué or teasing
photographs and provocative comments about drinking, recreational drug use
and sexual exploits in what some mistakenly believe is relative privacy.‖).
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over twenty-five percent of hiring managers perform Internet
searches when vetting job applicants. 10 At Georgetown University,
a law firm interviewer reportedly confronted a law student with
pictures from his Facebook page showing him flipping his middle
finger.11
Michelle Morris, a lecturer in law at the University of Virginia
Law School, believes that Internet misbehavior among law
students has gotten out of control:
Many law students are enjoying an ―extended adolescence‖
marked by inappropriate and immature behavior. From a
law student flashing traffic and then taunting police, to
Facebook.com profiles that openly celebrate law students‘
illegal, immoral or unwise behavior, a visible population
openly prioritizes ―fun today‖ over preparation for
tomorrow. . . . Millennial generation law students in
particular tend to compound this lack of judgment with a
propensity for posting every detail of their lives online,
creating a potentially permanent record of every unwise
choice they might make. They seem to believe that what is
―online‖ is not ―real‖ and cannot impact the physical world.
Only friends are supposed to see the photos they post of
themselves drunken and half-dressed. Only fellow jokesters
on your message board will read your juvenile threats, and
they will relish your savage sense of humor. 12
To combat this scourge of Internet malfeasance, Morris
proposes that law schools require all applicants to disclose their
10

Press Release, Careerbuilder.com (Oct. 26, 2006), available at
http://careerbuilder.com (follow ―About Us‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Press
Release Archive 2006‖ hyperlink; then follow ―10/26/06‖ hyperlink). Twelve
percent of the hiring managers surveyed searched social networking sites when
screening applicants. Id.
11
Sheila Marikar, After Years of Telling All, 20-Somethings Start to Clam
Up, ABCNEWS.COM, Mar. 1, 2007, available at http://abcnews.go.com/
US/Technology/Story?id=2912364&page=1. The interviewer allegedly asked
the student how he planned to represent the law firm in light of the obscene
gesture in the photograph. Id.
12
Michelle Morris, The Legal Profession, Personal Responsibility, and the
Internet, 117 YALE L.J. 53, 56 (Pocket Part 2007).
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online identities before enrolling in law school. 13 In her opinion,
―aspiring lawyers need to understand that Internet activity is public
behavior and conduct themselves accordingly.‖14 Under the
―Morris Plan,‖ law school applicants would have to divulge a
three-year history of ―e-mail addresses, IP addresses, blogs, and
social networking profile information.‖15 Morris argues that this
would deter inappropriate online behavior while enabling law
schools to tie ―bad behavior to particular people.‖ 16 Finally, it
would send a message to law students: ―Clean up your act. We‘re
watching.‖17
Despite its admirable intentions, the ―Morris Plan,‖ as applied
to state law schools, is poor public policy that runs afoul of the
First Amendment right to free association. 18 The Supreme Court
13

Id. at 58. Morris also proposes that the American Bar Association (ABA)
institute the same disclosure policy as part of their ―Good Moral Character‖
requirement. However, this Note focuses only on the disclosure requirement for
law school applicants. For a detailed discussion of the ABA‘s ―Good Moral
Character‖ requirement, see Aaron M. Clemens, Facing the Klieg Lights:
Understanding the “Good Moral Character” Examination for Bar Applicants,
40 AKRON L. REV. 255 (2007); Elizabeth Gepford McCulley, School of Sharks?
Bar Fitness Requirements of Good Moral Character and the Role of Law
Schools, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839 (2001).
14
Morris, supra note 12, at 58.
15
Id. at 58. It is not clear whether Morris intends for this identifying
information to be used only for admission purposes, or whether it would be
retained (and possibly accessed) for the duration of the law student‘s enrollment.
For information about Internet protocol (IP) addresses, see infra note 34.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
As ―state actors,‖ state law schools are bound by the Constitution. See
generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (noting that the race-based
admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law School triggered strict
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment). For this reason, this Note focuses
on the constitutionality of the Morris Plan as applied by state law schools.
However, private law schools may also be considered ―state actors.‖ See, e.g.,
Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288,
295 (2001) (―[S]tate action may be found if, though only if, there is such a
‗close nexus between the State and the challenged action‘ that seemingly private
behavior ‗may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.‘‖) (quoting Jackson v.
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). For a detailed examination of the
―state action‖ doctrine, see, for example, Michael L. Wells, Private Parties as
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has described the freedom of association as the ―right to associate
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.‖19 In addition,
the Court has consistently held that mandatory disclosure of
membership lists that might have a chilling effect on an
individual‘s exercise of his or her associational freedoms violates
the First Amendment.20 Thus, the Morris Plan fails to recognize
that the right to free association protects all types of association,
whether they occur in a boardroom or in the blogosphere. 21
This Note examines the faults with the Morris Plan and offers
alternative ways to promote ethical online conduct at public law
schools that would not run afoul of the Constitution. Part I of this
Note explores the social, political, and cultural aspects of Internet
use among law students. Part II reviews freedom of association
case law up through Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,22 the Supreme
Court‘s most recent examination of the issue. Part III argues that
(1) blogs and social-networking activity, conducted with online
aliases, email and IP addresses, are ―expressive associations‖ 23 that
are entitled to First Amendment protection; (2) mandatory
disclosure of online associations by state law schools would have a
chilling effect on student association;24 and (3) the disclosure
Defendants in Civil Rights Litigation: Identifying State Actors in Constitutional
Litigation: Reviving the Role of Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99
(2004).
19
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
20
See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Gibson v. Fla.
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
21
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000) (―[T]he First
Amendment protects the Boy Scouts‘ method of expression.‖) (second emphasis
added).
22
Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
23
See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618.
24
This Note does not consider the Morris Plan‘s potential infringement on
student free speech. For a detailed discussion of student free speech on college
campuses, see, for example, Karyl Roberts Martin, Note, Demoted to High
School: Are College Students’ Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of High
School Students?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 173 (2003); Chris Sanders, Commentary,
Censorship 101: Anti-Hazelwood Laws and the Preservation of Free Speech at
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requirement ultimately violates the First Amendment because
while it may address compelling state interests, those interests may
be achieved by means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms. Finally, Part IV offers several alternative measures law
schools might enact to promote ethical online conduct while
preserving associational freedoms.
I. ONLINE ACTIVITY: AMBIENTLY AWARE OR PORNOGRAPHIC
LITTLE LOONS?
According to Morris, the Internet enables ―tech-savvy‖25 law
students to embarrass themselves, other students, and the law
school by hurling insults from behind a veil of anonymity. 26 Law
schools, she argues, have an obligation to stem the tide of online
misconduct ―[t]o avoid further injury to the reputation of our law
schools and the legal profession.‖27 Morris‘ characterization of
Internet use among law students, however, is overly broad and
general. 28 By failing to fully examine the breadth and complexity
Colleges and Universities, 58 ALA. L. REV. 159 (2006). For a close examination
of student free speech on the Internet, see Brannon P. Denning & Molly C.
Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student Cyberspeech, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835 (2008); Kara D. Williams, Public Schools vs.
Myspace & Facebook: The Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U.
CIN. L. REV. 707 (2008).
25
Morris, supra note 12, at 53.
26
Id. at 58–59 (explaining that the disclosure requirement would ―make[]
clear to anonymous abusers that their behavior is relevant whether or not
conducted in their own names‖). On Autoadmit.com, for example, users can
create an anonymous ―Login Name.‖ Autoadmit.com homepage,
http://autoadmit.com (follow ―Register‖ hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
And according to one survey, twenty percent of bloggers who self-identified on
their blog use a variant of their real name. SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 59 (quoting
Fernanda B. Viégas, Bloggers’ Expectations of Privacy and Accountability: An
Initial Survey, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., vol. 10, issue 3 (2005),
available at http://jcmc.Indiana.edu/vol10/issue3/viegas.html).
27
Morris, supra note 12, at 53. There is some precedent to Morris‘ call for
action: the University of New Mexico temporarily banned access to
Facebook.com. Cristian Lupsa, Facebook: A Campus Fad Becomes a Campus
Fact, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 13, 2006, at 13.
28
See Morris, supra note 12, at 56 (―From a law student flashing traffic and
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of law student online expression, Morris misidentifies the problem
that her plan seeks to remedy. 29
Contrary to Morris‘ dismissive portrayal, the Internet has
emerged as the modern public commons—a space where young
people freely and frequently engage in a variety of social and
political discourse.30 But modern Internet expression is not easily
reduced.31 Rather, it is infinitely diverse and complex. 32 Platforms
for Internet self-expression and communication include e-mail,
weblogs, wikis, social networking sites, peer-to-peer technology,
open source software, and social ―tagging‖ applications. 33 The
Morris Plan, however, is indiscriminate: it implicates all of these
online entities because it requires disclosure of student IP
addresses.34 Disclosure of one‘s IP address means, at least

then taunting police, to Facebook.com profiles that openly celebrate law
students‘ illegal, immoral or unwise behavior, a visible population openly
prioritizes ‗fun today‘ over preparation for tomorrow.‖) (citations omitted).
29
Morris may also overstate the problem: nearly ninety-five percent of
Facebook users use their real name. Zeynep Tufekci, Can You See Me Now?
Audience and Disclosure Regulation in Online Social Network Sites, 28 BULL.
SCI., TECH. & SOC‘Y 20, 26 (2008).
30
See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a
Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49
B.C. L. REV. 741, 749–50 (2008) (―The Internet, embodied in the World Wide
Web, email, listserves, chat rooms, weblogs, and instant messaging, has
revolutionized the organization of grassroots political movements.‖).
31
See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, W(h)ither the Middleman: The Role and
Future of Intermediaries in the Information Age: Social Software, Groups, and
Governance, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 153, 156 (2006) (arguing that ―[c]omputer
users are using technology collaboratively, explicitly, and in a multiplicity of
ways that we can see for the first time‖).
32
See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 17 (―The Internet allows information to
flow more freely than ever before. We can communicate and share ideas in
unprecedented ways. These developments are revolutionizing our selfexpression and enhancing our freedom.‖).
33
See Madison, supra note 31, at 157–64.
34
Effectively all Internet activity falls under the Morris Plan since it
requires disclosure of student IP addresses. See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 143,
147 (explaining that an IP address is ―a unique number that is assigned to every
computer connected to the Web . . . and that [w]henever a user communicates
over the Internet, her IP address is logged‖).
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potentially, the disclosure of everything one is doing with that IP
address.35
This Note focuses on two of the largest and most popular
vehicles for online expression targeted by the Morris Plan: blogs
and social networking sites. 36 Although the mandatory disclosure
of student e-mail addresses is particularly troubling, Morris seems
interested in e-mail addresses only in so far as they are used to
engage in unethical online conduct at websites and blogs like
Facebook and Autoadmit. 37 For this reason, this Note focuses on
the associational aspects of blogs and social-networking sites.
A. Blogs and Social-Networking Sites: The Basics
As of 2009, forty-three percent of people age eighteen to thirtytwo read blogs; twenty percent created one.38 Blogs come in
several varieties. 39 Some resemble personal online diaries 40 where
the blogger confesses everything from what he or she ate for
lunch41 to his or her latest sexual escapade.42 Other blogs resemble
35

Once the school administrator gained access to a law student‘s IP
address, he or she would have to take affirmative steps to then locate the
particular websites the student had visited.
36
Not only are blogs and social-networking sites large and popular, but
Morris seems particularly concerned about their misuse. The entire introduction
to Morris‘s article focuses on blog misconduct and she singles-out the socialnetworking site Facebook as enabling students to ―openly celebrate law
students‘ illegal, immoral, or unwise behavior.‖ Morris, supra note 12, at 53–56
(citations omitted).
37
Id. at 58.
38
Sydney Jones & Susannah Fox, Generations Online in 2009, in PEW
INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 5 (2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/
(follow ―Generations Online in 2009‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
39
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
40
See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 49 (―Blogs . . . enable people to express
themselves like they‘ve never been able to before. They encourage people to
share their lives with strangers, to open up their diaries to the world.‖).
41
See Lunch in a Box, http://lunchinabox.net (last visited, Feb. 28, 2009).
42
For example, an entry on the personal blog of a then twenty-six-year-old
bartender from New York reads: ―My period is way late, and I haven‘t been laid
in months, so I don‘t know what the fuck is up.‖ Emily Nussbaum, Say
Everything, N.Y. MAG. Feb. 12, 2007, available at http://nymag.
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traditional web sites that disseminate news and information on
specific subjects like celebrity gossip, 43 real estate,44 politics, 45 and
the law.46 Many of these ―news‖ blogs have supplanted traditional
media outlets as major sources for news and information.47
Whether blogs are personal or more professional in nature, they
are nevertheless dynamic platforms where groups of individuals
exchange thoughts and ideas. 48 Once the blogger creates the
original content, blog readers augment that content by posting
responses and comments.49 Thus, blogs are ―more akin to an
ongoing conversation than to a mainstream media publication or
broadcast.‖50
Similarly, social-networking sites allow ―friends and
acquaintances . . . [to] interlink their profiles, share personal
information, and communicate with each other.‖51 Over eighty-five
com/news/features/27341/.
43
See, e.g., Gawker.com homepage, http://www.gawker.com.
44
See, e.g., Curbed.com homepage, http://www.curbed.com.
45
See, e.g., Huffingtonpost.com homepage, http://www.huffington
post.com.
46
Lawyers have become prolific bloggers. For example, Abovethelaw.com,
which was started by a former Assistant U.S. Attorney from Newark, New
Jersey, has emerged as required reading for law students and lawyers thirsting
for inside information regarding law firm salaries, hiring, and firing. See
Jonathan Miller, He Fought The Law. They Both Won, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2006, at 14NJ1. Meanwhile, Blawg.com is a directory of over 2,000 legal blogs,
many of which are authored by law professors. Blawg.com homepage,
http://www.blawg.com (follow ―About‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
47
For example, the political blog Talkingpointsmemo.com is largely
credited with publicizing then Senate majority leader Trent Lott‘s controversial
comments regarding Senator Strom Thurmond. See Paul Krugman, The Other
Face, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A39.
48
See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 49 (―Blogging allows people to exchange
experiences . . . . Blogging represents the very best that communication has to
offer.‖).
49
See Blogger.com (follow ―Quick Tour‖ hyperlink) (―In simple terms, a
blog is a web site, where you write stuff on an ongoing basis. New stuff shows
up at the top, so your visitors can read what‘s new. Then they comment on it or
link to it or email you. Or not.‖).
50
SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 9.
51
Id. at 26.
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percent of college students have a social networking profile, 52
while Facebook alone claims more members (roughly 100
million) 53 than the population of Germany (roughly eighty-two
million). 54 On Facebook,55 users can ―tag‖ photographs from last
night‘s party, link to an article on CNN.com, and wish a friend
good luck on her torts exam by writing on her ―Wall.‖56
Additionally, Facebook users can maintain an ongoing
commentary about their own emotional and psychological state by
constantly updating their Facebook ―status.‖57 Lastly, users can
limit access to their Facebook profile to specific individuals or
groups.58
While Morris believes that blogs and social-networking sites
merely allow students to enjoy an ―extended adolescence,‖ 59 the

52

Tufekci, supra note 29, at 25.
Blog Posting of Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Facebook, to The Facebook
Blog, http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?blog_id=company (Aug. 26, 2008,
12:21 EST).
54
See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2009). The Boy Scouts of America, meanwhile, claims only
around four million members. Boy Scouts of America National Council,
available at http://www.scouting.org (follow ―Fact Sheets‖ hyperlink; then
follow ―BSA at a Glance‖ hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
55
Other popular social networking sites include Myspace, Xanga, and
Livejournal. See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 24.
56
The ―Wall‖ feature on a Facebook profile is like a digital bulletin board
where friends can post short messages. See ―Facebook‖ Wikipedia page,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook (describing the ―wall‖ as ―a space on
every user‘s profile page that allows friends to post messages for the user to
see‖) (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
57
Facebook provides users with a ―status‖ space on their profile where they
can write a short message describing what they are doing, thinking, or feeling at
any particular moment. Status updates tend towards the witty, clever, and
mundane.
58
See http://www.facebook.com (follow ―Privacy‖ hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 23, 2009). Users can control who has access to their photographs, personal
information, and status updates. See http://www.facebook.com (follow ―Click
here to go to Privacy Settings‖ hyperlink) (membership required) (last visited
Feb. 28, 2009).
59
Morris, supra note 12, at 56.
53

SABIN_6-5-09

6/6/2009 1:08 PM

EVERY CLICK YOU MAKE

709

overwhelming evidence suggests otherwise. 60 In fact, studies
indicate that perpetual online chatter may actually enhance our
social, technological, literacy, and interpersonal skills. 61
B. How Incessant Online Activity Makes Us Better
It is easy to dismiss much of this online chatter as exhibitionist,
narcissistic, and mindless.62 People over the age of thirty often
belittle the young and wired as ―pornographic little loons who post
their diaries, their phone numbers . . . [and] their stupid poetry‖
and yet ―have zero attention span, flitting like hummingbirds from
one virtual stage to another.‖63 Morris similarly dismisses Internet
activity, lampooning law students as enjoying an ―‗extended
adolescence‘ marked by inappropriate and immature behavior.‖64
This response, however, fails to consider the complex political,
social, and cultural implications of perpetual online
communication.65
First, constantly communicating the often-banal details of
one‘s life through blogs or Facebook may actually foster, rather
than erode, interpersonal relationships. 66 By allowing individuals
60

See Tamar Lewin, Study Finds Teenagers’ Internet Socializing Isn’t Such
a Bad Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A20.
61
Id.
62
See Claire Suddath, 25 Things I Didn’t Want to Know About You,
TIME.COM, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/arts/article
/0,8599,1877187,00.html.
63
Nussbaum, supra note 42, at 3.
64
Morris, supra note 12, at 56.
65
See Nicole Ellison, Charles Steinfield & Cliff Lampe, The Benefits of
Facebook “Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social
Network Sites, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (2007).
66
See Lewin, supra note 60 (―It may look as though kids are wasting a lot
of time hanging out with new media, whether it‘s on MySpace or sending instant
messages . . . [b]ut their participation is giving them the technological skills and
literacy they need to succeed in the contemporary world. They‘re learning how
to get along with others.‖) (quoting Mizuko Ito, lead researcher of the
MacArthur Foundation study, available at http://www.macfound.org/) (follow
―New Study Shows Time Spent Online Important for Teen Development‖
hyperlink).
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to share small, seemingly irrelevant bits of personal information,
blogs and social networking sites increase emotional awareness. 67
For example, a person would probably not call his friend at ten
P.M. to tell her that he had just stubbed his toe. But on Facebook,
he can post the infuriating toe-stubbing incident in his status bar.
His friends can then learn about it at their leisure. Over time, the
mundane details add up: a toe-stubbing today, bad sushi tomorrow
night, a difficult day at the office on Friday. Social scientists call it
―ambient awareness.‖68 Technology journalist Clive Thompson
explains that ―[e]ach little update—each individual bit of social
information—is insignificant on its own, even supremely
mundane. But taken together, over time, the little snippets coalesce
into a surprisingly sophisticated portrait of your friends‘ and
family members‘ lives, like thousands of dots making a pointillist
painting.‖69
In addition to ―ambient awareness,‖ blogs and socialnetworking sites promote collective action and group cohesion. 70
In the political realm, for instance, both 2008 presidential
candidates used blogs and social-networking sites to raise millions
of dollars in small online donations. 71 President Obama recruited
and organized thousands of volunteers through his Facebook
network and even released photographs of his election night
celebration on the photo-sharing website Flickr.com.72 The
67

See Lewin, supra note 60.
See Clive Thompson, The Brave New World of Digital Intimacy, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/09/07/magazine/07awareness-t.html.
69
Id. at 3. And the information shared on blogs and social-networking sites
is not always mundane. According to one study of undergraduate social
networking profiles, forty-six percent revealed their political views, seventy-two
percent their sexual orientation, and roughly forty-five percent their religion.
Tufekci, supra note 29, at 28.
70
See Madison, supra note 31, at 154 (The Internet ―is about people, not
merely about information. Computing builds connections, networks, and
pathways for information and activity, channels that . . . enable the group.‖).
71
See Michael Luo, Obama’s September Success Recasts the Campaign
Fund-Raising Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at A21.
72
See Damien Cave, Generation O Gets its Hopes Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2008, at ST1. Obama also has a Twitter account with over 300,000 followers.
68

SABIN_6-5-09

6/6/2009 1:08 PM

EVERY CLICK YOU MAKE

711

political influence of blogs and social-networks, however, is not
limited to traditional political parties. 73 Moveon.org, the
progressive online advocacy group with over 3.2 million
members, 74 is largely credited with delivering the House of
Representatives to the Democrats in 2006. 75 In addition,
Jewsvote.org attracted over two million viewers to The Great
Schlep, an online video where comedian Sarah Silverman urged
Jewish voters to convince their grandparents in Florida to vote for
Obama. 76
Blogs and social-networking sites have also democratized the
nature of knowledge and information. 77 In his book The Wisdom of
Crowds,78 James Surowiecki argues that large, diverse, and
decentralized groups are often more effective than individuals at
solving problems. 79 Consider Wikipedia, 80 the open-source, online
Barack Obama Twitter Page, http://twitter.com/BarackObama (last visited Feb.
23, 2009) (registration required).
73
See Jose Antonio Vargas, Moveon Grows Up, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2008,
at C01.
74
See Moveon.org, http://www.moveon.org/ (follow ―About‖ hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
75
See Vargas, supra note 73. Moveon.org spent $28 million promoting
Democratic candidates in 2006. The National Rifle Association, meanwhile,
spent $11 million. Moveon.org uses blogging technology and email blasts to
raise money from its online faithful, get out the vote on Election Day, and
pressure representatives through online petitions. Id.
76
Patrick Oppmann, “Great Schlep” Pitches Obama to Florida Jews,
CNN.COM, Oct. 14, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/13/great.
schlep/index.html. The Great Schlep also has a Facebook group with over
24,000 ―schleppers.‖ The Great Schlep Home Page, http://www.thegreatschlep.
com (follow ―the Great Schlep‖ hyperlink).
77
See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (Doubleday
2004).
78
Id.
79
See Madison, supra note 31, at 171–72 (arguing that technology allows
users to form ―cognitive groups‖ that are better able to solve problems than
individuals acting alone).
80
Technically, Wikipedia is a ―wiki‖ rather than a blog. See ―Wiki‖
Wikipedia page, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki (describing a ―wiki‖ as ―a
page or collection of Web pages designed to enable anyone who accesses it to
contribute or modify content, using a simplified markup language‖) (last visited
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encyclopedia of, from, and by the people. 81 With over ten million
articles82 on everything from Justin Timberlake‘s discography83 to
Derridean deconstruction,84 Wikipedia has become the preferred
destination for students, journalists, and laymen to confirm and
create historical fact.85 And despite the seeming unreliability of
thousands of people cobbling together a history of the world,
Wikipedia has proven surprisingly accurate: according to a 2005
Nature study, its science articles are just as accurate as those in
Encyclopedia Britannica.86
Meanwhile, other individuals directly tap into their socialnetworks to solve problems through a process known as
―microsharing.‖87 For example, when Laura Fitton, a social-media
consultant, asked the 5,000 or so people following her Twitter
posts88 for help after her accountant made a mistake on her tax
return, she received several lawyer referrals within minutes. 89
Dec. 1, 2008).
81
Wikipedia claims over 75,000 contributors and 684 million visitors a
year. Wikipedia Page, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited
Oct. 18, 2008).
82
Press Release, Wikipedia Foundation, Wikipedia Hits Milestone of Ten
Million Articles Across 250 Languages (Mar. 28, 2008), available at
http://wikimediafoundation.org (follow ―Press Room‖ hyperlink; then follow
―28 March 2008‖ press release hyperlink).
83
―Justin Timberlake Discography‖ Wikipedia page, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Justin_Timberlake_discography (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
84
―Jacques Derrida‖ Wikipedia page, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derrida
(last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
85
See Brock Read, Can Wikipedia Ever Make the Grade?, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Oct. 27, 2006, at 31.
86
See Wikipedia Survives Research Test, BBC NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4530930.stm.
87
See Pistachio Consulting homepage, http://pistachioconsulting.com
(follow ―Microsharing‖ hyperlink) (―[M]icrosharing fosters collaboration,
communication, professional development, finding answers and resources and
other well-demonstrated effects that can optimize business performance.‖).
88
Twitter is a ―real-time short messaging service‖ that users can access via
the web or cell phone. See Twitter homepage, http://twitter.com/ (follow ―About
Us‖ hyperlink). Twitter posts, or ―tweets,‖ work in much the same way as
Facebook ―status updates.‖
89
Thompson, supra note 68, at 6.
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Fitton says that she ―can solve any problem on Twitter in six
minutes.‖90 Meanwhile, according to New York Times technology
journalist David Pogue, a judge on a grant proposal committee
asked his Twitter followers if a certain proposal had been tried
before.91 Pogue reported that ―in 15 seconds, his followers replied
with Web links to the information he needed. No e-mail message,
phone call or Web Site could have achieved the same effect.‖92
Individuals are increasingly engaging in this sort of ―microsharing‖
through Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr for everything from
emotional support to professional guidance.93
By increasing interpersonal connections and promoting the
formation of dynamic groups, the Internet has fundamentally
transformed the way that law students relate to the world. 94 This is
not to say that the Internet is not also a vehicle for procrastination,
mischief, and mindless fun. 95 Rather, the point is simply that
Internet use among law students is not nearly as monolithic as
Morris suggests.96 Given the breadth and scope of Internet activity,
any proposal to infringe on that activity—let alone one as broad
and sweeping as the Morris Plan—should be examined with
exacting scrutiny to ensure that the plan does not violate individual
constitutional rights.

90

Id.
David Pogue, Twitter? It’s What You Make It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2009, at B1.
92
Id.
93
See Microsharing, supra note 87 (―Microsharing reduces the emotional
and intellectual distance between people and helps them become more engaged,
connected, effective and collaborative.‖).
94
This is admittedly a cursory and incomplete examination of the Internet‘s
social and cultural effects. Entire books have been written about the subject. See,
e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN
A CONNECTED WORLD (2001).
95
For example, the ―Kitten Cannon‖ computer game provides hours of
neuron-depleting fun. Addicting Games, http://www.addictinggames.com/
kittencannon.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
96
See Morris, supra note 12, at 56.
91
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The First Amendment provides that ―Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble . . . .‖97 Although ―freedom of
association‖ is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has consistently found such a freedom inherent in
the First Amendment‘s protection of free speech and free
assembly. 98 The First Amendment protects all associational
content99 from both direct and indirect attacks. 100 Group
association, the Court has held, enables ―[e]ffective advocacy of
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones.‖101 Thus, the right of free association ―lies at the foundation
of a free society.‖102

97

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (―It
is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the . . . Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.‖). See also Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (―[W]e have long understood
as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment
a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.‖); Linda E.
Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the
Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 636 (2004) (―The right [of free
association] is not freestanding, but exists only in order to enable the exercise of
other constitutional rights.‖).
99
See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460–61 (―[I]t is immaterial whether the beliefs
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or
cultural matters.‖).
100
For example, regulations that merely ―chill‖ the exercise of free
association are still subject to the ―closest scrutiny‖ under the First Amendment.
Id. at 461. See also Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539, 544 (1963) (―Freedoms such as [free association] are protected not only
against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled from more
subtle governmental interference.‖) (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
523 (1960)).
101
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460.
102
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1960).
98
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The right to free association, however, is not absolute.103 The
First Amendment protects only those associations that are
―expressive‖ in nature.104 The Court has construed ―expressive
association‖ broadly, 105 noting that ―[a]n association must merely
engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be
entitled to protection.‖ 106 Also, the government may limit
associational freedoms if the limitation serves ―compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through a means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.‖107
Freedom of association cases have evolved along two separate
but related lines.108 First, there are cases in which the right to free
association has been indirectly infringed, or ―chilled,‖ by
government regulation.109 The second line of cases involves direct
infringement of associational freedoms by government regulations
prohibiting organizations from excluding certain individuals. 110
A. Indirect Attack: Disclosure of Membership Lists
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the ―freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas‖ is
103

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
Id. (―To determine whether a group is protected by the First
Amendment‘s expressive associational right, we must determine whether the
group engages in ‗expressive association.‘‖).
105
See Strandburg, supra note 30, at 784 (―The Court‘s definition of an
‗expressive association‘ deserving protection is broad . . . .‖).
106
Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. While an expressive association must have some
degree of organization, it does not have to disseminate a specific message,
express itself through a particular ―method,‖ or have unanimity of opinion
among its members. Id. at 655.
107
Id. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623
(1984)).
108
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(indirect infringement); Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (direct infringement).
109
Cases involving indirect infringement are typically ones requiring
membership disclosure. See, e.g., NAACP, 357 U.S. 449.
110
See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Bd. of
Dirs. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
104
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protected under the First Amendment. 111 Indirect infringements on
associational freedoms are generally prohibited, 112 and will only be
upheld if substantially related to compelling state interests.113 Most
indirect infringements on associational freedoms have occurred
through state attempts to compel disclosure of organizations‘
membership lists. 114
In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court found that the mandatory
disclosure of NAACP membership lists violated the First
Amendment because the privacy of group membership was ―so
related to the rights of the [NAACP] members to . . . associate
freely with others.‖115 The Court struck down the disclosure
requirement because it did not have a ―substantial bearing‖ on a
substantial state interest.116 Similarly, the disclosure requirement in
Shelton v. Tucker117 was also invalidated because the inquiries into
public teachers‘ past associational ties ―impair[ed] that teacher‘s
right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech
and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free
111
112

NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460.
See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544

(1963).
113

See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (―[E]ven though the
government purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved.‖).
114
See, e.g., NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; Gibson, 372
U.S. 539.
115
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 466. The Court dismissed Alabama‘s contention
that any suppression of free association resulting from the disclosure of
membership lists would come from private actors and not the state. Id. at 463
(―[I]t is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the
production order that private action takes hold.‖).
116
Id. at 464 (―Whether there was ‗justification‘ in this instance turns
solely on the substantiality of Alabama‘s interest in obtaining membership
lists.‖). The Court found that there was no substantial bearing between
disclosure of NAACP membership lists and the state‘s interest in enforcing its
business registration policies, but the Court was silent as to whether the state‘s
business registration policy was itself a ―substantial interest.‖ Id. at 464–65.
117
364 U.S. 479. The case involved an Arkansas statute requiring every
public school teacher to annually file an affidavit disclosing every organization
to which she had belonged, or contributed, within the previous five years.
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society.‖118 The Court found that even though the state had a
legitimate interest in inquiring into teachers‘ past association
activities, the ―unlimited and indiscriminate‖119 means to serve that
interest excessively burdened associational freedoms. 120 Likewise,
the Court struck down the Arizona State Bar‘s requirement that
applicants disclose membership in the Communist Party, holding
that Arizona had a ―legitimate interest‖ in evaluating the character
and fitness of individuals seeking to practice law in the state, but
that that interest was not served by requiring disclosure of
Communist Party membership.121
On the other hand, the Court found that the surveillance of
political activity by the U.S. Army did not violate individuals‘
right to free association in Laird v. Tatum.122 There, the Court
found that the alleged chilling effect on associational freedoms was
merely speculative, 123 and that there was no claim of a ―specific

118

Id. at 485–86.
Id. at 490.
120
Id. at 488 (―[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.‖).
See also, Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
There, the Court struck down Florida‘s mandatory disclosure of NAACP
membership in order to identify its Communist members. The Court suggested
that while the state may have had a compelling interest in uncovering members
of the Communist Party, the disclosure requirement was not substantially related
to that interest. Id. at 547–48 (―[T]he Communist party is not an ordinary or
legitimate political party, as known in this country, and . . . because of its
particular nature, membership therein is itself a permissible subject of regulation
and legislative scrutiny.‖). Presumably, if there was evidence of Communist
activity by NAACP members, infringement of their associational freedoms
would pass judicial scrutiny.
121
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971). In particular, the Court
found that Arizona had ample basis to evaluate the petitioner‘s character and
fitness because she had already disclosed organizations to which she belonged
since the age of sixteen. Id. at 7.
122
408 U.S. 1 (1972).
123
Id. at 13 (noting that the respondents‘ claims arose from a ―speculative
apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information
in some way that would cause direct harm to the respondents‖).
119

SABIN_6-5-09

718

6/6/2009 1:08 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

present objective harm or threat of specific future harm.‖124
In sum, state actions such as mandatory disclosure of
membership lists that indirectly ―chill‖ free association violate the
First Amendment unless substantially related to compelling state
interests.125 The same holds true for direct infringements on
associational freedoms.126
B. Direct Attack: Prohibitions on Associational Exclusion
Government attempts to directly prohibit or restrict an
association‘s membership will only be upheld if they ―serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,
that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive
of associational freedoms.‖ 127 In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
for example, the United States Jaycees, a nonprofit civic
organization for men, 128 challenged a Minnesota statute prohibiting
gender discrimination in places of public accommodation. 129 The
124

Id. at 14.
See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
126
See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
127
Id. at 623. This strict scrutiny standard of review mirrors the standard of
review for indirect infringements on free association but with several important
differences. First, the Court suggests that regulations are ―narrowly drawn‖
when they are the ―least restrictive on associational freedoms.‖ Id. Second, the
Court adds the additional requirement that government infringements on free
association must be ―unrelated to the suppression of ideas.‖ Id. Although the
Court does not articulate a specific standard of review for governmental
infringements on ―intimate associations,‖ its language suggests that they would
be subject to at least strict scrutiny, if not something more stringent. See id. at
620 (―[T]he Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State‘s power
to control the selection of one‘s spouse that would not apply to regulations
affecting the choice of one‘s fellow employees.‖).
128
Women could only become ―associate‖ members, which meant that they
could not vote, hold national or local office, or participate in various leadership
programs. Id. at 613.
129
Id. at 614–15. The Act also prohibited discrimination on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion, disability and national origin. Id. at 615. The Act
defined ―places of public accommodation‖ broadly to include businesses,
accommodations, refreshments, entertainment, recreation and transportation
facilities that are made available to the public. Id.
125
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Court upheld the statute, holding that ―Minnesota‘s compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens
justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees
may have on the male members‘ associational freedoms.‖ 130 In Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale,131 however, the Court invalidated a
seemingly similar New Jersey public accommodations law, which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of, among other things,
sexual orientation.132 The Court held that New Jersey‘s public
accommodations law imposed a significant burden on the Boy
Scouts‘ associational freedoms. 133 The Court was notably silent on
whether New Jersey had a compelling interest to eradicate
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 134
In this line of cases, the Court has also indicated that the right
to free association is available only to associations that are either

130

Id. at 623. Specifically, the Court found that the Jaycees ―failed to
demonstrate that the Act impose[d] any serious burdens on the male members‘
freedom of expressive association.‖ Id. at 626–27. See also Bd. of Dirs. v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (holding that a California
statute prohibiting the Rotary Club and other civic organizations from excluding
women did not violate the First Amendment because it served the compelling
state interest of eliminating discrimination against women and imposed no
significant infringements on the Rotary Club members‘ associational freedoms).
131
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
132
Id. James Dale successfully sued the Boy Scouts in New Jersey state
court for violation of the law after they expelled him for being homosexual. Id.
at 646–47. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the public
accommodations law did not violate the Boy Scouts‘ right to free association
because New Jersey had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination and
the law did not significantly burden the Boy Scouts‘ associational freedoms. Id.
at 647.
133
Id. at 656. The Court concluded that the Boy Scouts were burdened by
the law because the organization believed that ―homosexual conduct [was]
inconsistent with the values it [sought] to instill in its youth members . . . .‖ Id.
at 654. The Court based this finding on its inspection of the Boy Scout Oath and
Law, position statements, and public pronouncements. Id. at 649–53.
134
Id. at 657 (recognizing that ―in cases such as Roberts . . . [s]tates have a
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women in public
accommodations,‖ but refusing to say whether states have a similar interest in
eliminating discrimination against homosexuals in public accommodations).
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―intimate‖ or ―expressive.‖135 ―Intimate associations‖ are ―intimate
human relationships‖ such as marriage, childrearing, and
cohabitation with one‘s relatives.136 ―Expressive associations,‖
meanwhile, are larger and more attenuated relationships, which are
an ―indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties‖
protected by the First Amendment.137 The Jaycees138 and Boy
Scouts139 were both considered ―expressive associations‖ for free
association purposes because they are ―collective effort[s] on
behalf of shared goals‖ that are ―especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression
from suppression by the majority.‖ 140 In City of Dallas v.
Stanglin,141 however, the Court upheld a Dallas city ordinance
restricting admission in certain dance halls to people between the
ages of fourteen and eighteen142 because ―chance encounters in
dance halls‖ are not ―expressive association[s].‖143 In upholding
the statute, the Court emphasized that the dance club did not
constitute an expressive association in large part because its
admission policy was not selective, the teenagers had no real
relation to each other, and they did not ―take positions on public
135

See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984).
Id. at 617, 619.
137
Id. at 618.
138
Id. at 622 (―In view of the various protected activities in which the
Jaycees engages . . . that right [to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends] is
plainly implicated in this case.‖).
139
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000) (―It seems
indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values
engages in expressive activity.‖).
140
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622. The Court noted that expressive associations
may be political, social, economic, educational, religious, or cultural in nature.
Id.
141
490 U.S. 19 (1989).
142
Id. at 20.
143
Id. at 25 (―We think the activity of these dance-hall patrons—coming
together to engage in recreational dancing—is not protected by the First
Amendment. Thus this activity qualifies neither as a form of ‗intimate
association‘ nor as a form of ‗expressive association‘ as those terms were
described in [Jaycees].‖).
136
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questions‖144 or perform any of the other similar activities
described in Duarte. 145
In sum, the First Amendment right to free association is
violated when: (1) the association is expressive or intimate in
nature; (2) associational freedoms have been directly or indirectly
infringed; and (3) the infringement is not narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest.146
III. THE MORRIS PLAN: INDIRECT ATTACK ON FREE ASSOCIATION
The Morris Plan seeks to regulate a wide range of Internet
activities by requiring disclosure of ―online aliases, e-mail
addresses, IP addresses, blogs, and social networking site profile
information.‖147 By doing so, the Morris Plan would unlawfully
infringe on law students‘ right to free association.148 First, the
Internet activities targeted for disclosure are expressive in
nature.149 Second, the disclosure requirement, like the disclosure
requirements in NAACP150 and Shelton,151 has an objective
―chilling effect‖ on law students‘ associational freedoms. 152
Finally, although states may have a compelling interest to ensure
the character and fitness of future lawyers, the disclosure
144

Id.
Those activities included ―humanitarian service, high ethical standards
in all vocations, good will, and peace.‖ Bd. Of Dirs. v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
146
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
147
Morris, supra note 12, at 58. Presumably, when Morris says that ―blogs‖
should be disclosed, she means that individuals who operate or contribute to a
blog must reveal the name of the blog and/or the alias used in making blog
posts.
148
Morris acknowledges that the disclosure requirement would deter
students from engaging in certain online activities. See id. (―The more salient
effect [of the disclosure requirement] is the in terrorem signal to the applicant
that online identity is a relevant part of character to be evaluated by
authorities.‖).
149
See infra pp. 722–25.
150
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
151
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
152
See Morris, supra note 12, at 58.
145
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requirement is not narrowly drawn to serve that interest.
A. Expressive Association
As a threshold matter, the Internet activities targeted by the
Morris Plan are entitled to First Amendment protection only if they
are ―expressive associations.‖ 153 This requires a fact-specific
inquiry into the ―size, purpose, policies, [and] selectivity‖ of a
particular activity. 154 The problem is that the Morris Plan
implicates virtually all Internet activities. 155 While online aliases
and IP addresses are not themselves ―expressive associations,‖
they are vital tools with which individuals engage in ―expressive
association‖ online. IP addresses, for example, are essential to
every online activity from web browsing to email. 156 Similarly,
―online aliases‖ include screen names and user names for message
boards, commercial websites, and instant
messaging
applications.157 This Note focuses on the expressive nature of the
online associations specifically mentioned by Morris: blogs and
social-networking sites. 158
1. Blogs
Blog creators and contributors are members of expressive
associations.159 First, blogs are organized. 160 Blog creators and
153

See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (―To
determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment‘s expressive
associational right, we must determine whether the group engages in ‗expressive
association.‘‖).
154
See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
155
See Morris, supra note 12, at 58.
156
See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 147 (―Whenever a user communicates over
the Internet, her IP address is logged.‖).
157
For example, Facebook requires an email address and user name.
Facebook Homepage, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). So
does the Volokh Conspiracy, a popular legal blog. Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
158
Morris, supra note 12, at 58 (requiring disclosure of ―blog and social
networking site profile information‖).
159
Blog readers, on the other hand, would probably not be considered
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contributors have the shared goal of creating, consuming, and
disseminating news and information about a particular topic. 161
While a blog‘s community may be vast and largely anonymous, it
is still organized around a central digital hub where ideas and
opinions are expressed.162 Second, blogs have a degree of
selectivity. 163 Although blogs typically have no formal
membership procedures, they screen users by requiring registration
of a username and password before individuals can post comments
or responses.164 Finally, blog activity is distinctly expressive in a
way that teenagers gathered at a dance hall are not.165 Blogs are not
merely places of ―social association,‖ 166 but digital soapboxes
where users ―take positions on public questions.‖167 Blogs have
even acquired the reputation for advancing a pugnacious brand of
punditry. 168 In sum, blogs are precisely the kind of ―expressive
members of an expressive association because merely reading material on a blog
is not ―expressive.‖
160
See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 20 (describing the mechanics and structure
of blogging).
161
The fact that blog contributors may not unanimously agree on
everything or disseminate a specific message does not mean that it cannot still
be an expressive association. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655
(2000) (―The First Amendment simply does not require that every member of a
group agree on every issue in order for the group's policy to be ‗expressive
association.‘‖).
162
See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 19 (―Blogging is the rage these days. We
can all be pundits now, sharing our thoughts and pictures with a worldwide
audience.‖).
163
Id. at 20 (noting that users must set up an account, and sometimes pay a
monthly fee, in order to create a blog).
164
For example, Abovethelaw.com requires contributors to provide a
username, email address, and password. Above the Law Sign Up,
http://abovethelaw.com/profile/signup (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
165
See generally City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
166
Id. at 23.
167
Id. at 25.
168
For example, after the 2008 presidential election, Vice-Presidential
contender Sarah Palin dismissed many of her critics as ―bloggers in their
parents‘ basement just talking garbage.‖ See David Hinckley, Sarah on the
Offense: Takes to the Media & Says She’ll Plow Through The Door If There’s
An Opening, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 11, 2008, at 6.
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association‖ that have been recognized by the Supreme Court
because they are ―collective effort[s] on behalf of shared goals‖ in
which individuals ―associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends.‖169
2. Social Networking Sites
Social networking sites like Facebook are also expressive
associations.170 Facebook literally organizes groups of individuals
according to educational, geographic, political, and religious
categories.171 In this sense, Facebook is the digital analog to
traditional organizations such as the NAACP and Boy Scouts.172
Also, like traditional organizations, Facebook has formalized
membership procedures whereby individuals must create an
elaborate user profile in order to join a particular network.173 The
Facebook community also exercises a degree of selectivity because
users can restrict access to their profiles.174 Finally, Facebook
activity is distinctly ―expressive‖ because members constantly
―take positions on public questions‖ 175 through ―Wall‖ posts,
169

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
Since the Morris Plan specifically identifies Facebook as an example of
a social networking site, this Note uses Facebook as representative of all social
networking sites. Morris, supra note 12, at 56 (discussing ―Facebook.com
profiles that openly celebrate law students‘ illegal, immoral or unwise
behavior‖).
171
This is not an exhaustive list. Facebook users can create network
categories based on everything from favorite bands to favorite foods.
172
In fact, both of those organizations have Facebook networks with
thousands of members. See Facebook.com homepage, http://www.facebook.
com/ (search for NAACP and Boy Scouts) (registration required) (last visited
Apr. 24, 2009).
173
For example, only individuals with a Brooklyn Law School email
address can join the Brooklyn Law School network on Facebook.
174
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
175
The fact that those ―public positions‖ might range from Brad Pitt‘s new
movie to Barack Obama‘s cabinet selections has no bearing on Facebook‘s
status as an expressive association. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (―Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs
170
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―Status Updates,‖ and personal notes.176 Even if much Facebook
chatter is personal and trivial, Dale makes clear that an association
need not disseminate a specific ―message‖ or advocate a particular
position in order to be expressive. 177 Rather, the association must
―merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in
order to be entitled to protection.‖178
B. The Chilling Effect of Disclosure Under the Morris Plan
Upon review of the expressive association nature of blogs and
social networking sites, it is clear that the Morris Plan‘s disclosure
requirement indirectly infringes on law students‘ right to free
association by chilling the exercise of their associational freedoms.
The Morris Plan creates a chilling effect because its unlimited
and indiscriminate scope would create ―serious burdens‖179 on the
associational freedoms of law students. In Shelton, the Court found
that the disclosure of all associational activities within a five-year
period chilled associational freedoms because it was ―completely
unlimited.‖180 The Morris Plan is similarly unlimited: it requires
the disclosure of all blogging and Facebook activity within a threeyear period.181 The exhaustive reach of the disclosure requirement
provides law students and prospective law students with no

sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious, or
cultural matters.‖).
176
These highly personal Facebook connections might even qualify as
―intimate associations.‖ See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620
(1984) (describing ―intimate associations‖ as involving ―deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not
only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one‘s life‖).
177
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000). The Dale Court
also noted that ―[t]he First Amendment protection of expressive association is
not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must
engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private.‖ Id. at 648.
178
Id. at 655.
179
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 626.
180
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
181
See SOLOVE, supra note 2.
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meaningful direction as to how to regulate their online activities.182
Before typing every blog post or Facebook message, students
would wonder whether they were being monitored by the school
administration.183 Thus, like the teachers in Shelton, the pressure
upon a law student to ―avoid any ties which might displease those
who control his professional destiny would be constant and
heavy.‖184 Forced to choose between exercising their First
Amendment rights and obtaining a legal education, many students
would likely choose the latter.185
Additionally, the chilling effect under the Morris plan would be
―objective.‖186 Unlike the alleged chilling of associational
freedoms in Laird, the chilling effect under the Morris Plan derives
from a specific and known governmental regulation directed at
specific individuals. 187 In Laird, the chilling effect was merely
―subjective,‖ and thus unprotected by the First Amendment,
because the petitioners did not know who or what the military was
monitoring. 188 Under the Morris Plan, however, each individual
182

In fact, the disclosure requirement imposed on law students through the
Morris Plan is virtually identical to the disclosure requirement imposed by
President Barack Obama on applicants for positions within his cabinet. See
Jackie Calmes, For a Washington Job, Be Prepared to Tell All, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2008, at A1 (reporting that job applicants must reveal ―blog posts and
links to their Facebook pages,‖ in addition to ―all aliases or ‗handles‘ used to
communicate on the Internet‖).
183
This is precisely the point of the Morris Plan. See Morris, supra note 12,
at 58 (noting that the purpose of the disclosure requirement is to send the
message: ―Clean up your act. We‘re watching.‖).
184
Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486.
185
The overly broad scope and breadth of the Morris Plan is especially
troubling within the educational context. As the Court in Shelton observed: ―The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools.‖ Id. at 487.
186
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972).
187
Under the Morris Plan, each applicant would have to disclose her online
identifying information. Thus, each applicant would know that she was being
directly monitored. Morris, supra note 12, at 58.
188
Laird, 408 U.S. at 11 (noting that the chilling effect arose ―merely from
the individual‘s knowledge that a governmental agency was engaged in certain
activities‖). The Court‘s distinction between subjective and objective ―chilling
effects‖ functions as a standing requirement limiting the extent to which the
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student is required to disclose his or her online associational
activities, thus giving rise to a ―threat of specific future harm‖ 189—
namely, the threat of retaliation if the school disapproves of the
student‘s online activities.190 This chill on associational freedoms
is therefore objective, rather than speculative and subjective, and is
protected under the First Amendment.
Since the Morris Plan imposes an ―objective‖ chilling effect on
law students‘ expressive associations, it will only be upheld if it is
narrowly drawn to a compelling state interest and ―unrelated to the
suppression of ideas.‖191
C. Compelling State Interest?
It is not immediately clear what state interest is served under
the Morris Plan. On the one hand, Morris writes that the disclosure
requirement is necessary ―[t]o avoid further injury to the reputation
of our law schools and our legal profession.‖192 This would not
likely rise to the kind of substantial state interest recognized by the
Court in its free association cases because it does not involve
compliance with a state statute,193 the competency of public
employees,194 or issues of domestic security. 195

Court will recognize an indirect infringement claim under the First Amendment.
189
Id. at 14.
190
See Morris, supra note 12, at 58 (noting that ―online identity is a
relevant part of character to be evaluated by authorities‖) (emphasis added). It is
not clear who exactly these ―authorities‖ might be.
191
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
192
Morris, supra note 12, at 53.
193
See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
194
See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
195
See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Reputational integrity involves
highly subjective matters of public perception that may or may not implicate
some other substantial state interest. For example, perhaps reputational integrity
in public law schools is necessary to promote public confidence in its legal
institutions. But Morris is silent as to what state interests might be served by
maintaining the reputational integrity of state law schools. Thus, without further
explanation, the state does not have a compelling interest in protecting the
reputation of its law schools.
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On the other hand, Morris suggests that the disclosure
requirement is necessary to ensure the ―character and fitness‖ of
future lawyers.196 This likely is a compelling state interest.197 In
Baird, the Court found that Arizona had ―a legitimate interest in
determining whether petitioner has the qualities of character and
the professional competence requisite to the practice of law.‖ 198
Similarly, Shelton found that the state had a compelling interest to
―investigate the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to
teach in its schools.‖199 Thus, the state arguably has an analogous
interest to ensure the fitness and competency of its law students,
especially considering the public role they will have as future
attorneys.
However, even if the Morris Plan does serve a compelling state
interest, the disclosure requirement is directly related to the
suppression of ideas and therefore violates the First
Amendment.200 Morris concedes that the purpose of the disclosure
requirement is to ―discourage‖ law students from engaging in
anonymous and offensive online conduct.201 Moreover, the Morris
Plan uses veiled threats to ensure that offensive student online
association202 is sufficiently suppressed.203 Thus, the stated
purpose of the Morris Plan is to suppress the expression of those
ideas that Morris, or the law school, deems offensive. 204 The Court
has consistently held that such governmental infringements on free
association cannot stand.205
196
197

Morris, supra note 12, at 57.
See Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1

(1971).
198

Baird, 401 U.S. at 7.
Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485.
200
See Morris, supra note 12, at 58 (noting that the disclosure requirement
―discourages‖ online behavior that is ―anonymous‖ and ―stupid‖).
201
Id. at 53, 58 (emphasis added).
202
Morris neglects to define offensive online conduct, nor does she suggest
how law schools might arrive at their own definition.
203
Morris, supra note 12, at 58 (noting that law students must be ―caught‖
and that online identities will be ―evaluated by authorities‖).
204
See id. at 58.
205
See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
199
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D. Least Restrictive on Associations’ Freedoms
The Morris Plan also fails strict scrutiny because the state
interest to promote the character and fitness of future lawyers can
be achieved ―through a means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.‖206
The Morris Plan is over inclusive because it does not
discriminate between blogs with a history of user abuse, such as
Autoadmit.com, and blogs with no such history of user abuse. 207
Also, the Morris Plan requires disclosure of all blogging and
social-networking activity, rather than only those that might
promote inappropriate behavior.208 But the Supreme Court has
rejected overreaching of this sort.209 In Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Committee,210 for instance, the Supreme
Court struck down the mandatory disclosure of NAACP
membership lists because there was no ―substantial connection‖
between the NAACP and the Communist Party. 211 Here, there is no
substantial connection between many of the blogs targeted by the
Morris Plan and harmful online conduct.212 The mere fact that
some students have used the Internet for illegitimate purposes does
not establish a ―substantial connection‖ between the Internet and
illegitimate behavior that could justify the sweeping scope of the
Morris Plan. 213

206

Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
See Nakashima, supra note 7.
208
See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 147.
209
See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
210
372 U.S. 539 (1963).
211
Id. at 548.
212
If the Morris Plan were limited only to Autoadmit.com, it would come
much closer to being narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. But it is
not, and Morris fails to show a substantial connection between other blogs or
websites and harmful online conduct.
213
Saying that there is a substantial connection between the Internet and
harmful conduct would be like saying that there is a substantial connection
between telephones and offensive language.
207
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In short, the Morris Plan reaches too far.214 Like the invalidated
disclosure requirement in Shelton, the Morris Plan effectively
requires students to disclose ―every conceivable kind of
associational tie‖ on the Internet.215 It seeks to broadly regulate a
medium that is a conduit for all kinds of expressive associations.
Many of them are socially valuable, 216 and many of them are
not.217 However, the Supreme Court has explicitly found that the
First Amendment protects expressive association, regardless of its
content.218 To withstand the strict scrutiny triggered by
infringements on the right to free association, the Morris Plan
must, at a minimum, exercise a greater degree of selectivity. 219
IV. LESS RESTRICTIVE WAYS TO COMBAT INTERNET MISCONDUCT
There are several other less restrictive methods to curb
inappropriate online activity among law students.220 One
alternative is for law schools to institute a policy of ―traceable
anonymity.‖221 Under such a policy, students would be free to
engage in anonymous (or pseudo-anonymous) online activities so
long as their true identity could be traced in the event of harmful
online conduct.222 With ―traceable anonymity,‖ writes Daniel
Solove, professor of law at Georgetown University Law School,
―we preserve the right for people to speak anonymously, but in the
214

See Morris, supra note 12, at 58 (―Thus, my proposal: request a threeyear history of online aliases, e-mail addresses, IP addresses, blogs, and social
networking site profile information.‖).
215
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
216
See, e.g., WALL ST. J., Law Blog homepage, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
(last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
217
See, e.g., PerezHilton.com homepage, http://perezhilton.com (last
visited Feb. 28, 2009).
218
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000) (―The First
Amendment protects expression, be it of the popular variety or not.‖).
219
See id. at 648 (noting that infringements on free association may be
upheld if they serve compelling state interests ―that cannot be achieved through
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms‖).
220
See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 146.
221
Id. at 146.
222
See id. at 146–47.
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event that one causes harm to another we‘ve preserved a way to
trace who the culprit is.‖ 223
―Traceable anonymity‖ is wise public policy because it deters
harmful online conduct without restraining associational
freedoms. 224 Law students would be free to develop robust online
associations without fear that the administration was
―watching.‖225 Furthermore, ―traceable anonymity‖ already exists
with most, if not all, of the online activities targeted by the Morris
Plan226 since both blog posts and Facebook profiles are tied to a
user‘s IP address. 227 Thus, law school administration could track
down the perpetrator of any online harm with relative ease. 228
In addition, law schools could supplement ―traceable
anonymity‖ and give it some teeth with a ―Technology
Appropriate Use‖ policy. 229 These policies provide specific ethical
and legal standards for students accessing the Internet on school
computers or through school wireless networks.230 Such a policy
would provide students with clear standards and notice of the
disciplinary consequences following violations of those
standards.231

223

Id. at 146.
See id. at 147.
225
Morris, supra note 12, at 58.
226
See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 146 (―Traceable anonymity is for the most
part what currently exists on the Internet.‖).
227
See id. at 146–47 (―Whenever a user communicates over the Internet,
her IP address is logged . . . . It is indeed possible to make yourself untraceable,
but it involves significant care and know-how.‖).
228
See id.
229
Many, if not most, colleges and universities have some kind of
―appropriate use‖ policy for Internet use. See, e.g., Pace Law School,
Appropriate
Use
Policy
for
Information
Technology,
http://www.pace.edu/page.cfm?doc_id=27208 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
230
For example, Yale University‘s ―Information Technology Appropriate
Use Policy‖ prohibits technology use that ―impedes, interferes with, impairs, or
otherwise causes harm to the activities of others.‖ Yale University Technology
Appropriate Use page, http://www.yale.edu/policy/itaup.html (last visited Feb.
28, 2009).
231
See id.
224
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Finally, law schools could implement information campaigns
that educate students on the legal and ethical consequences of
inappropriate online conduct.232 As part of this effort, law schools
could inform students of the limits of free speech within the school
environment.233 Furthermore, law schools should advise
prospective employers of their online obligations. 234 For example,
according to Facebook‘s Terms of Use, the website is available for
―personal, non commercial use only.‖235 Thus, use of Facebook by
law firms to vet job applicants may be ―commercial use‖ that
violates Facebook‘s Terms of Use. 236
These are but several methods by which law schools might
decrease harmful and offensive online conduct without trampling
on student associational freedoms. But there is no silver bullet.
Rather, law school deans must exercise intelligence and creativity
to create a safe learning environment in which students can go
online freely without worrying that their every online move is
being ―evaluated by authorities.‖ 237

232

Morris acknowledges that schools should ―reinforce‖ the disclosure
requirement by ―[cautioning] first-year law students about maintaining
appropriate online personas.‖ Morris, supra note 12, at 58. It is not clear,
however, why this alone would not be sufficient to serve the compelling state
interest to ensure the character and fitness of future lawyers.
233
For example, language that constitutes a ―true threat‖ or ―fighting
words‖ would not be protected under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Roberts
Martin, supra note 24; Sanders, supra note 24.
234
See Carly Brandenburg, The Newest Way to Screen Job Applicants: A
Social Networker’s Nightmare, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 597 (2008).
235
Facebook, Terms of Use, User Conduct, http://www.facebook.com/
home.php#/terms.php?ref=pf (last visited Mar. 16, 2009) (emphasis added).
236
There may be recent precedent for this type of violation. In November
2008, a jury convicted a California mother for computer fraud because she
violated the MySpace user agreement by creating a false MySpace profile. The
woman used the fraudulent profile to harass a teenage girl who ultimately
committed suicide. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Woman Found Guilty in Web Fraud
Tied to Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2008, at A25. For a detailed discussion of
how employers use social-networking sites to vet job applications, and how such
use may violate the law, see Brandenburg, supra note 234.
237
Morris, supra note 12, at 58.
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CONCLUSION
Harmful and offensive online conduct among law students is a
serious problem. 238 Its remedy, however, requires a nuanced
approach that minimizes infringement of associational freedoms
while deterring and detecting online abuse. The Morris Plan does
not strike this balance. First, it constructs a simplistic caricature of
law students‘ Internet use that fails to recognize the depth and
complexity of their online expression. 239 Second, the Morris Plan
is so broad and indiscriminate that it is certain to intimidate law
students and keep them from exercising their associational
freedoms online. 240 Finally, the Morris Plan ignores alternative
measures, such as ―traceable anonymity‖ and targeted disclosure,
which would deter harmful online conduct without trampling on
associational freedoms.241
―Clean up your act,‖ Morris scolds law students. ―We‘re
watching.‖242 But the Morris Plan watches the wrong thing. Rather
than peering at blog posts and staring at status updates, law schools
should be watching out for law students‘ constitutional rights.
Odds are it will be a more worthwhile endeavor.

238
239
240
241
242

See Nakashima, supra note 7.
Morris, supra note 12, at 56.
Id. at 58.
See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 146.
Morris, supra note 12, at 58.

